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The traditional image of Turkish civil-military relations is well 
known: Weak elected officials carry out the day-to-day business of 
government while a strong, popular military establishment keeps its 
eye on them, ready to step in and mount the occasional coup d’état 
in order to keep the national modernization process on track. Recent 
years, however, have seen this picture transformed. Not only have 
the civilian politicians gained in strength and prestige, but the gener-
als seem ready—or at least resigned—to see the military’s influence 
shrink. 
How has this happened, will it last, and what does it suggest about 
prospects for democratic consolidation in Turkey? In order to frame 
answers to such questions, a brief look back will be helpful. The main 
characteristic of the traditional style of civil-military relations alla 
turca lies in the armed services’ particular view of civilian politics. 
Since the Liberation War (1919–22) that forged the modern Republic 
of Turkey out of part of the old Ottoman Empire, military leaders have 
considered themselves the nation’s watchdogs. In their opinion, civil-
ian politicians fall short of full trustworthiness since they represent all 
the potential divisions (religious, ideological, and ethnic) that might 
jeopardize the safety of the hard-won Republic and the course of mod-
ernization that it was set upon by its founder (himself the most famous 
of all Turkish military men), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). 
Senior military officers evinced a desire to stay “above” politics and 
politicians in the sense both of remaining unsullied by them and of re-
taining control over them. In keeping with this dual attitude, the gen-
erals staged frequent coups—four between 1960 and the “postmodern 
Journal of Democracy  Volume 23,  Number 1  January 2012
© 2012 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
Turkey Under the AKP
101Ersel Aydınlı
coup” of 1997—but kept the actual periods of military government to 
intervals of a few years or less.
As accompaniments to its lofty position, the Turkish military enjoyed 
a range of both formal and informal powers, prerogatives, and perqui-
sites. Until fairly recently, the uniformed chiefs of the armed services 
were able to dominate civilian cabinets by means of the National Se-
curity Council, a body through which the generals in effect laid down 
policy guidelines on a range of topics, with ministers more or less bound 
to comply. Moreover, military budgets and spending were free of close 
parliamentary scrutiny, military courts operated apart from civilian au-
thority, the military had substantial domestic police and intelligence-
gathering capabilities through the Gendarmerie, and the military estab-
lishment even ran its own businesses. In short, it showed some of the 
characteristics of what some might call a “state within a state,” which 
makes it easier to understand how it could periodically stage coups, as it 
did in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997.1 
In recent years, relations between Turkey’s political and military 
realms have been going through a deep structural transformation toward 
a more democratic, civilian-dominated system. Barring unexpected re-
versals in this trend, civilians and soldiers, as well as citizens and schol-
ars, will need to get used to Turkey’s new, though still evolving, civil-
military paradigm.2
The transformation stems from dynamics within the military itself 
as well as from outside causes. Turning first to the internal factors, we 
can make a further distinction between those related to the military’s 
practices and those related to certain characteristics in the military’s 
nature. For decades, the Turkish military had virtual carte blanche in 
its autonomous practices. Viewed as the country’s most-trusted public 
institution, the military received little or no criticism. It ran unchecked 
into excesses such as covert disinformation and psychological opera-
tions meant to discredit civilian figures who had drawn the generals’ ire. 
Years of being able to do what they liked without even verbal opposition 
made officers overconfident and blinded them to the ferment that was 
taking place among civilian politicians and bureaucrats. 
The military’s complacent “business as usual” persistence in its 
dubious practices had the cumulative effect of alienating its allies in 
Turkish society. Each coup, though conducted with fairly broad public 
support, nevertheless caused irreparable damage to military ties with 
this or that social sector. In 1970, the military gravely disappointed 
left-wing revolutionary groups by deserting them and intervening in 
politics on the side of the center-right status quo and the Western alli-
ance. Ten years later, the military not only crushed the leftists, but also 
jailed nationalists who had been fighting alongside the state against 
communists. With the “postmodern coup” (orchestrated through the 
National Security Council) of 28 February 1997 against Islamist pre-
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mier Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, the military lost many 
of its remaining “friends” and made enemies of the liberal intellectuals 
and journalists who found themselves blacklisted alongside Islamists 
during this period. Even worse, the anti-Islamist rhetoric of generals 
such as Çevik Bir and Güven Erkaya became so extreme that even 
the moderately pious among Turkey’s 96 percent Muslim population 
could take offense or feel threatened.3 
Before long, these alienated circles would be lending crucial support 
to the overhaul of civil-military relations. All militaries must care to 
some degree about public good will, but Turkey’s is in a special class, 
for it has, for all intents and purposes, long been the country’s leading 
undeclared political party. As such, isolation and dependence on a small 
base of ultrasecularist supporters were conditions that it could ill afford. 
The military lost not only friends but face. The events surrounding 
the 1997 coup revealed mistakes and operational inefficiencies that took 
some of the shine off the military’s reputation even in the eyes of those 
not overtly opposed to its interventions in politics. As external scrutiny 
and critical commentary increased, military leaders responded errati-
cally. For example, when state prosecutors claimed to have found evi-
dence of military plans to move against Islamists, the army’s chief of 
staff dismissed the alleged document as an unsubstantiated “piece of 
paper.” When the signed original soon became public, the military had 
to backtrack, making it look incompetent if not downright deceptive. By 
adding the disillusioned to the ranks of the alienated, the military was 
undermining its own position. 
Divisions Within, Pressures Without
Other sources of the shift in civil-military relations can be traced to 
the nature of the Turkish military itself. Despite appearances of insti-
tutional unity, divisions within the military establishment are nothing 
new. A prominent one separates soldiers with generally urban and elite 
“early modernizer” or civil-service backgrounds from their comrades 
with more traditional and nonelite rural roots. Although the military’s 
training regimen aims to make the latter more like the former, it has 
never fully eliminated this divide. 
A subtler ideological split distinguishes officers who favor rapid and 
military-directed strides (not excluding coups) toward modernizing and 
Westernizing Turkey from those inclined toward a more gradual ap-
proach that trusts civilians more. The former (we might call them the 
“absolutists”) believe that until Turkish society and politics mature, they 
must be carefully guided by the strong hand of the state and, above all, 
by its armed forces. The latter (or “gradualist”) group argues that coups 
and other harsh tactics are counterproductive and that working with the 
civilians is a better way of achieving modernization. 
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Divisions such as these were essential to the transformation of the 
civilian-military relationship because they provided the basis for the 
pact-making seen in so many cases of democratization.4 With such dif-
ferences present in senior-officer ranks, it became possible for transfor-
mation-seekers both in civilian office and in uniform to find potential 
negotiating partners along the tricky path to change. 
For eight decades after the Republic’s founding, the absolutists ruled 
the military’s inner councils. Not even NATO membership or closeness 
to the EU could change this, since outside parties either felt a keen inter-
est in avoiding anything that might weaken Turkish arms or remained 
content to treat Turkey as an exception. As the Cold War ended and the 
twentieth century drew to a close, however, it was becoming clear that 
the absolutist approach was failing to resolve several domestic problems 
and proving an increasingly problematic anachronism in the eyes of the 
international community. In a process aided by the EU’s accession re-
quirements,5 cooperation between civilians and the more gradualist ele-
ments in the military came to seem the better path forward. 
At the same time that external ideological pressures were encour-
aging the erosion of absolutist viewpoints, concrete pressures against 
the older model of civil-military relations also began to build. The key 
event was the 2002 electoral victory (since repeated in 2007 and 2011) 
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under onetime Erbakan 
associate Recep Tayyip Erdo¢gan. With the ironic help of a feature 
built into the constitution by the military regime of the early 1980s (a 
high 10 percent threshold for party representation in parliament), the 
Islamic-oriented AKP emerged as a dominant ruling party in place of 
the unsteady multiparty coalitions that had long followed each other in 
and out of office in Ankara. 
With the AKP successful at providing coherent governance and eco-
nomic growth, and Turkish society as a whole becoming more confident 
and assertive, the political space available for the military to occupy has 
shrunk. The media, for example, no longer comprises a relative handful 
of newspapers and television stations, but now includes dozens of new 
outlets. Postsecondary education is expanding as well, and larger num-
bers of Turkish citizens are gaining access to diverse ideas. And perhaps 
of most immediate importance, a new business class is rising rapidly in 
wealth and influence, spearheaded by entrepreneurs from the heartland 
region of Anatolia. The world of civilian politics, in short, is becoming 
enriched and expanded. The military’s traditional junior partners from 
elite bureaucratic circles and the old-money realm of state-favored in-
dustry have to a large degree been pushed aside by the newly wealthy 
“Anatolian tigers” and the AKP. With a strength stemming from num-
bers and diversity, the new-model civilian powers can afford to ques-
tion old governing styles and standard operating procedures such as the 
military’s role in politics. 
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The most concrete example of such “pushback” and questioning is 
the pressure that has been exerted on the absolutists and their civilian 
supporters since 2007 in connection with the massive Ergenekon in-
vestigation. This complicated and long-running criminal inquiry has 
purported to expose a secret organization, allegedly tied to the military 
and national-security establishment, that has carried out various violent 
agent provocateur operations as a means of undermining the AKP gov-
ernment.6 While shifts in norms have provided an important backdrop to 
paradigmatic change, the spectacle of high-ranking officers being pros-
ecuted and jailed on charges of threatening civilian authority has taken 
a major toll on the absolutists.
Whether one finds all the evidence and charges in the Ergenekon cases 
to be credible or agrees with the underlying goals of the investigation 
itself, one cannot help but be impressed by the strength and confidence 
that the civilians have shown in pushing this matter as far as they have. 
Most notably, the politicians have learned to use certain security agen-
cies, primarily the regular civilian police, against the security establish-
ment’s own previously dominant circles—a fascinating display of Tur-
key’s divided governance system, in which cops working for the elected 
civilian government of the day are targeting that supreme institution of 
the permanent unelected state, the army.7 
The civilian government has been carefully walking a tightrope, al-
lowing newly emerging networks in some areas of the security estab-
lishment (the main such network is associated with the Islamic move-
ment led by Fethullah Gülen) to flush out and prosecute antigovernment 
elements in the army.8 This quiet cooperation has placed major new 
deterrent power in the hands of the civilian governing elite. Although 
numerous controversies and doubts remain about the civilians’ motives, 
the outcome of the situation has been to introduce a counterbalancing 
force that can at least “push back” against the longstanding influence of 
the military over political life. 
The Future of the New Paradigm
Absolutism among the Turkish military appears to be in irreversible 
decline, and the gradualists seem to have won. But one could argue 
that the normative shift is going farther—toward a fuller subordination 
of the military to civilian authority that would surpass the still some-
what antidemocratic framework and assumptions of old-line gradual-
ism. A sign of this further shift can be seen in evolving public reac-
tions to Article 35, the section of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal 
Service Code that declares the military’s “duty” to “watch over” the 
Republic, whose words generals traditionally cite as a rationale for 
political intervention. When former army chief General Hilmi Özkök, 
a key gradualist, was quoted in 2007 as saying that Article 35 was a 
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natural brake that the politicians needed “because they sometimes go 
too far,”9 reaction was muted. By contrast, when his successor General 
Iºık Koºaner said in mid-2011 that the article was not actually neces-
sary because the duty that it announced would remain the military’s 
“natural, historical mission” in any case, media and political reaction 
was immediate and overwhelmingly negative.10 Similarly, recent re-
ports and assessments originating from within the armed forces them-
selves all agree that Article 35 needs to be lifted.11 Throughout these 
discussions and even the Ergenekon arrests, the current military lead-
ership has remained largely quiescent. Service commanders and staff 
chiefs (including General Koºaner) did act as one in requesting retire-
ment in late July 2011 as a protest against fresh Ergenekon arrests, but 
their gesture made hardly a ripple as new appointees took their places. 
In the old paradigm of Turkish civil-military relations, the system 
could best be described as one in which military leaders presented 
their expert ideas about what they deemed national threats and then 
proceeded to act according to their own lights in countering them. In 
the new system, the military still presents expert opinions, but it is 
now civilian authorities who ultimately decide what the threats are 
and what to do about them. This is not to say, however, that we should 
expect to see a purely U.S. or West European model of civil-military 
relations become a reality in Turkey. Instead, it is more likely that the 
Turkish military will retain a large measure of special prestige and 
weigh more heavily in final national-security decision making than is 
the case in the West, but within a democratic framework. Rather than 
being rejected as still “imperfect” by Western standards, this Turkish 
model might be seen as containing an appropriate element of balance 
against unleashed civilian power. Perhaps it may also offer Turkey 
an optimal mix of civilian and military influence, given the country’s 
position in an unstable neighborhood, the continuing domestic and in-
ternational security threats that it faces, and its consequent need for a 
strong military. 
As a side benefit, the advent of civilian supremacy could strengthen 
the military as a fighting force. Armies that act as “political outfits” 
often become notoriously distracted from the actual business of sol-
diering. In Turkey, whole units have sometimes been focused solely 
on preparing top officers for interactions with civilian politicians, and 
senior commanders have spent inordinate amounts of time and energy 
on such dealings. Under the new paradigm, senior leaders can be free 
of such burdens and commit themselves more fully and directly to the 
operation and improvement of the institution itself. Moreover, civilian 
oversight of the military should bring with it a greater sense of civilian 
“ownership” and thus fuller support. Given the civilians’ apparent goal 
of expanding Turkey’s role as regional power, they will certainly need 
a potent military. Thus civilian control may ironically foster a military 
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that is not only more concerned with events beyond Turkey’s borders 
but also (in the purely military sense) more powerful. 
Where to Go from Here?
Normative change is taking place, but it needs to be backed by insti-
tutional change. This must include moving the Turkish military into a 
new defense ministry, one in which civilian and military expertise can 
be integrated, but where elected civilian authority has the last word. 
Although the military has been agreeing in principle with the changes 
that are under way, it has so far not made effective moves toward ac-
tive transformation, such as setting up a strategic unit for handling the 
reform process in the short and long terms. The generals are not only on 
the defensive, but also genuinely at sea—they have, after all, no prec-
edent for such a transformation. It is vital therefore, that the civilians 
handle their side of the process carefully.
First, the civilians must provide the military, and particularly its re-
maining absolutist circles, with an honorable exit rather than continued 
humiliation. Militaries run on feelings—of honor, pride, patriotism, and 
esprit de corps—that civilians’ own sense of enlightened self-interest 
should lead them to respect. At the moment, the Turkish armed forces 
appear under fire (more than 15 percent of active generals are in pris-
on), supported only by sporadic civilian rhetoric about the military’s 
ongoing “importance.” At a minimum, civilians should find methods of 
handling the Ergenekon trials more quickly and discreetly, and should 
consider offering amnesty to those who are charged. Turkey will also 
need a combined civil-military advisory council—it should comprise 
serving and retired officers as well as key civilians—in order to help the 
armed forces manage their withdrawal from undue political involvement 
without damaging their strength as a purely military organization. This 
council should advise parliament on how to redefine the military’s insti-
tutional position within the new round of constitutional changes that the 
nation is currently debating.
It is important to keep in mind that some of the civilians currently 
handling the reform process see themselves as victims of the military’s 
earlier interventions. Such individuals have a duty to treat the current 
situation not as a chance for revenge, but rather as an opportunity to set 
up standards that will become touchstones for a new era of civil-military 
relations in a modern, democratic Turkey. Absent civilian self-restraint, 
the military will continue to play an undue political role—only this time 
less as a haughty intervener than as the tool of a new set of elites.
Looking to the military establishment itself, two immediate sugges-
tions can be offered. First, the promotions system needs a complete 
overhaul to make it more objective and transparent, with clear provi-
sions for oversight and redress. The new system must ensure that junior 
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officers can trust more in the value of doing their jobs well and worry 
less about currying favor with higher-ups (as in the current flawed sys-
tem that encourages cliques to form and officers to carry out question-
able orders for the sake of advancement).12 
Second, military training in this country of universal male conscrip-
tion also needs reform. Currently, the military’s key officer cadres come 
from a handful of high schools and university-level institutions whose 
internal affairs, including curriculum, teaching staff, and management, 
are completely under the military’s bureaucratic and ideological control. 
One suggestion is to abolish military training at the high-school level 
so that the young and impressionable will no longer be exposed to in-
doctrination. Another suggestion would be to allow civilian university 
graduates into the system in order to broaden the scope of thinking and 
attitudes within the ranks. Once charged with producing statesmen and 
leaders for the country, military training should now be about producing 
excellent military leaders who are ready to work with civilians, under 
the latters’ authority, for a better Turkey. 
In dealing with the changing civil-military picture in Turkey, the 
international community must maintain a balance. A democratizing 
Turkey needs a military that is subordinate to duly constituted civilian 
authority, but this military must remain efficient and strong if Turkey 
is to serve as a realistic model for other Middle Eastern countries in 
an era of political ferment. International support for new-model civil-
military relations should thus be marked by a certain caution, and not 
be directed exclusively toward eroding the military’s strength.
Finally, it is necessary to ask whether there is any chance that Tur-
key’s civil-military transformation process will be halted or thrown off 
course. Perhaps the most significant threat to continued reform is the 
Kurdish question, which includes the thorny security problem posed by 
the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its use of violence both within 
Turkey and from bases in northern Iraq. If the civilian leadership fails to 
show good judgment and maturity in handling this issue, which has cost 
tens of thousands of lives over the last few decades, the country could 
become destabilized. Should that occur, the possibility always remains 
for a push—societal and military—to return to the old paradigm under 
conditions that will benefit no one. All must therefore take whatever 
steps are needed to ensure that this does not happen.
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